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2A-10/26/94 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
SUFFOLK COUNTY LOCAL 852, TOWN OF 
BROOKHAVEN BLUE COLLAR UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13165 
TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ Of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
COOPER, SAPIR AND COHEN (DAVID M. COHEN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Suffolk County Local 852, Town of Brookhaven Blue Collar Unit 
(CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
pursuant to remand, dismissing its charge that the Town of 
Brookhaven (Town) had violated §209-a.l(c) and- (d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally 
subcontracting to a private carter work which had been 
exclusively performed by unit employees and by acting with 
improper motivation. 
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The ALT had originally dismissed the charge,-7 finding that 
the work performed by the private company, Star Recycling, Inc. 
(Star), was not substantially similar to the work performed by 
unit employees. We reversed and remanded-7 the case to the ALJ 
on the §209-a.l(d) allegation,-7 instructing the ALJ to 
determine if the unit work in issue had been exclusively 
performed by the unit employees and whether the Town had changed 
the level of service that it offered to its constituency or 
otherwise made a managerial decision in contracting with Star. 
On remand, the ALJ determined that the work in question had not 
been exclusively performed by unit employees and he dismissed the 
charge on that basis. 
CSEA excepts on the basis that the ALJ erred in his 
definition of unit work and, therefore, erred in his dismissal of 
its charge. The Town concurs in the dismissal of the charge, but 
further argues, in cross-exceptions, that it made a managerial 
decision to change the level of service by contracting with Star. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
Since 1976, the Town has been operating landfills for the 
disposal of residential and commercial solid waste. It at one 
-"26 PERB 54538 (1993). 
?726 PERB 5[3066 (1993). 
-
7We affirmed the ALT's dismissal of the §209-a.l(c) allegation. 
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time operated three sites: Manorville, where the public brought 
trash and garbage and dumped it into containers;-7 Holtsville, 
where the trash from Manorville was brought by unit employees, 
compacted and buried; and Brookhaven, where the public and 
private haulers brought garbage and trash that was then 
compacted, hauled to another destination in the landfill, and 
buried. The compacting, transport of containers and hauling 
within Brookhaven has always been performed by employees in the 
CSEA unit. 
By 1991, the Holtsville site had become strictly an 
ecological site, used by the Town's Highway department to dump 
leaves, twigs and debris. Manorville was no longer operational 
and was converted to a compost station and recycling drop-off 
facility. Brookhaven by then had become the Town's primary 
landfill. Also by 1991, the Town had entered into several 
different contracts with private carters to haul garbage and 
trash within the Town. Private companies are responsible for 
residential hauling, for some commercial hauling, and for the 
hauling of recyclable materials, including paper and metal. 
These private carters transport the trash and garbage from 
curbside or dumpsters to either Manorville, or other locations, 
-''These containers are known as permanent transfer stations 
(PTS). 
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if the material is recyclable,-' or to Brookhaven. Some of the 
private companies utilize roll-off containers (referred to by the 
parties as temporary transfer stations or TTS) to collect and 
transport the trash and garbage to Brookhaven. The Town has also 
contracted for the removal from the landfill of leachates (i.e., 
rain and snow that has passed through the landfill and become 
contaminated). In fact, at the hearing, CSEA defined the work 
performed exclusively by unit members as the transport of trash 
from the containers at the Brookhaven landfill to its final 
destination: burial within the Brookhaven landfill. 
In January 1992, the Town entered into a multi-year contract 
with Star to load 200,000 tons of trash and garbage from the 
containers at the Brookhaven landfill-' into tractor trailers 
owned and operated by Star and to then transport the trash 
approximately forty miles to the Town of Hempstead's Recovery 
-''The Town contracts with a private carter, Jet, for the 
recycling of newspaper. Private carters bring the newspaper to 
the landfill; from the landfill, both Town employees and Jet 
employees bring it to its point of final destination at Jet. 
Likewise, the company responsible for scrap metal, Gershaw, picks 
up scrap metal from containers which it owns at Manorville and 
transports it to its point of final destination. 
-
;The Town still landfills approximately 100,000 tons of trash 
and garbage at Brookhaven, with the agreement of the State, based 
on its recycling program and its disposal of 200,000 tons of 
trash at the Hempstead facility. The work at Brookhaven relating 
to the handling and transport of the 100,000 tons of trash and 
garbage is still performed by CSEA unit employees. 
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Facility, where the trash is incinerated, generates electricity 
and is reduced to ash.-7 
Star employs six drivers at Brookhaven, who make four trips 
a day to the Hempstead facility. The trip to Hempstead is 
approximately forty miles and follows a route prescribed by the 
parties' contract. Star utilizes seven tractors and fourteen 
trailers on site at Brookhaven. The trailers are significantly 
larger than the ones owned by the Town and none are older than 
three years. Star also maintains Department of Environmental 
Conservation, Department of Transportation and New York City 
Department of Sanitation permits and has environmental impact 
insurance. Emergency road maintenance and replacement of 
equipment is provided by Star. 
The Town's fleet of trucks is considerably older than Star's 
and the Town does not presently have either the number or the 
type of tractors or trailers which Star utilizes. Also, the Town 
has a much smaller maintenance facility and does not have the 
equipment or employees presently to provide road maintenance on 
the level provided by Star. 
The Town argues that CSEA has narrowed its definition of 
unit work throughout the proceeding to permit a discernible 
boundary to be drawn around the work performed by its unit 
-
7The ash is transported back to Brookhaven, where it is disposed 
of at the landfill. Star does not haul the ash back to 
Brookhaven. 
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members so that exclusivity over that work can be maintained. As 
we noted, however, in Union-Endicott Central School District:-; 
We do not consider it material to the disposition of 
the charge whether or to what extent [charging party's] 
articulation of its discernible boundary theory changed 
during the processing of the charge or remained 
consistent throughout. The issue...before us is simply 
how the unit work should be defined for purposes of 
applying our principles governing the transfer of unit 
work, (footnote omitted) 
In defining unit work for purposes of transfer cases, we 
must look at the job duties performed by unit members. In our 
earlier decision in this matter, we found 
the unit work to be simply the tasks associated with 
the transportation of garbage and trash. The tasks 
involved in the transportation of garbage and trash and 
the qualifications for the performance of those tasks 
have not been changed by virtue of the fact that 
garbage and trash is now taken outside the Town lines, 
(footnote omitted) There is no demonstrable 
relationship between the particular geographic location 
to which garbage and trash is taken and the employees' 
job duties which are associated with the tasks of 
hauling that material.-7 
The ALT, relying on the first sentence above, dismissed the 
charge on remand, finding that CSEA had not established 
exclusivity over the unit work consisting of the tasks associated 
with the transportation of garbage and trash. CSEA argues that 
the unit work is the transport of garbage and trash from both 
permanent and temporary transfer stations owned by the Town to 
the point of final destination. We find, based on the record 
before us, that CSEA's proposed description of unit work is 
^26 PERB 53075, at 3145 (1993). 
?/26 PERB f3066, at 3121 (1993). 
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unrelated to the required duties of unit employees. The unit 
employees, as we noted earlier, are responsible for the tasks 
associated with the transport of trash and garbage. The unit 
work cannot reasonably be defined as the handling of some trash 
and garbage from some containers for transport to some points of 
final destination but not others. To draw a boundary, as CSEA 
urges, around the ownership of the trash containers from which 
the trash and garbage is transported or the nature of the trash 
in order to define unit work is to ignore the duties performed by 
unit employees which are unrelated to the ownership of the trash 
container. Both unit employees and private employees transport 
trash and garbage from PTS and TTS throughout the Town to the 
landfill or to other locations, which serve as the point of final 
destination. Both unit and private employees load trash and 
garbage from containers at the landfill for transport to its 
point of final destination, be that at another location within 
the landfill or an off-site destination. CSEA seeks to 
distinguish the nature of the trash, arguing that recyclables 
should be excluded from the definition of the trash unit 
employees are responsible for handling. Yet the record shows 
that unit employees also assist in the loading and transport of 
recyclable materials. The ownership of the containers is not a 
sufficient basis upon which to define a discernible boundary 
which would set apart the work performed by unit employees from 
the work performed by private employees.—7 Neither is the type 
^See County of Nassau, 21 PERB [^3 038 (1988) . 
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of trash or garbage sufficient to define the unit's work. 
Indeed, the material referred to as recyclable is more like the 
trash which is hauled to Hempstead for "recovery" than the trash 
which is buried at Brookhaven, for both are utilized for 
alternate purposes and are not simply disposed of at the point of 
final destination. In Union-Endicott. supra, the charging party 
urged us to define the work of a unit of school custodians as 
opening and closing the middle or high school buildings for 
weekend or holiday, school-sponsored student activities involving 
athletics or extra-curricular activities. We there found that 
unit work was the opening and closing of school buildings and 
declined to utilize only the circumstances in which nonunit 
individuals had not done that work even though such a narrow 
definition allowed the unit to maintain the necessary exclusivity 
over the work. We noted that "we have not recognized a 
discernible boundary when we have been unable to identify a 
reasonable relationship between the components of the discernible 
boundary and the duties of unit employees", (at 3145) Here, 
also, there is no reasonable relationship between the duties of 
transporting and handling trash and garbage and the boundaries 
CSEA urges us to utilize.—7 
We, therefore, dismiss CSEA's exceptions and affirm the 
ALJ's decision. Because of our decision, we need not reach the 
cross-exceptions filed by the Town relating to the nature of the 
service it now offers to its constituents. 
^See City of Buffalo, 24 PERB ?[3043 (1991) . 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 26, 1994 
Albany, New York jkuL^/%K\cs<A 
Paul ine R. K i n s e l l a , Chai rperson 
lp&r~ti. E i senbe rg , Member £• Walte -] 
E r i c J . Sczhmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DEER PARK ASSOCIATION OF 
CHAIRPERSONS/DIRECTORS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13990 
DEER PARK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
BEVERLY R. HACKETT, ESQ., for Charging Party 
COOPER, SAPIR & COHEN, P.C. (ROBERT E. SAPIR of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Deer Park 
Union Free School District (District) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the District had 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally combined the duties of the director of 
athletics with the duties of the director of physical education 
and health, positions represented by the Deer Park Association of 
Chairpersons/Directors (Association). The District excepts to 
the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in finding the 
charge to be timely, in finding the District's action to involve 
a mandatory subject of negotiations and in finding that the 
Association had not waived its right to negotiate the decision to 
Board - Case No. U-13990 -2 
combine duties. The Association concurs with the ALJ's decision 
on timeliness and the merits. 
From 1974 to 1991, the District had, at its discretion, 
staffed the positions of director of athletics and director of 
physical education and health either separately or as one 
position, with combined duties. The ALJ found that the District 
had determined to combine the duties of the director of athletics 
and the director of health and' physical education in May 1991. 
It then assigned Warren Deutsch,-7 at that time the director of 
athletics, to the new position of director of physical education, 
health and athletics. Bruce Jano, the director of physical 
education and health, was placed in a new assistant principal 
position at the Robert Frost Middle School and he was advised 
that it was for a period of one year. The assignments were 
effective September 1991. By memorandum dated June 25, 1991, 
Jano was advised by the District that "[i]n the event that the 
Directorship of Physical Education and Athletic Departments 
should open between this agreement and your retirement, you will 
be given the option of the right of first refusal, as per your 
request". The Association was made aware of the assignments by 
Deutsch and Jano shortly thereafter and it engaged the District 
in discussions about the possibility of additional compensation 
for Deutsch for the remainder of 1991, because of the alleged 
-^Deutsch was scheduled to retire at the end of the 1991-92 
school year. 
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increase in his job duties occasioned by the combination of the 
titles.V 
On February 14, 1992, the Association filed an improper 
practice charge alleging that the District had unilaterally 
combined the positions without providing additional compensation 
for the added duties. That charge was later withdrawn on the 
basis of a stipulation that the parties would negotiate in good 
faith on the issue of additional compensation for the director of 
physical education, health and athletics.-7 
Deutsch retired at the end of the 1991-92 school year, after 
advising the District in April 1992 of the criteria which should 
be used in selecting his successor to the position of director of 
physical education, health and athletics. On July 1, 1992, Jano 
assumed the position vacated by Deutsch.-1 On October 29, 1992, 
the Association filed this charge, alleging that "effective 
July 1, 1992, the Director of Physical Education and Health was 
unilaterally assigned the responsibilities of the position of the 
Director of Athletics".-7 
-'Deutsch carried out the discussions about extra compensation 
with the District with the approval and support of the 
Association. 
-'The parties were still engaged in negotiations pursuant to the 
stipulation at the close of the hearing in this case. 
-
7Jano retired from the District in June 1993. 
-
70n November 24, 1992, an amendment to the charge was filed by 
the Association alleging that the new duties assigned to the 
director of physical education and health "do not fall within the 
perimeters of the duties of that position." 
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For the reasons set forth below, the ALJ's holding that the 
charge was timely filed is reversed. 
It is undisputed that the decision to combine the two 
positions was made by the District in May 1991 and that the 
Association very shortly thereafter became aware of it. The new 
assignments were effective at the start of school in September 
1991. A charge filed in October 1992 based upon a unilateral act 
which occurred in May 1991 or, at the latest, in September 1991, 
is, pursuant to our Rules of Procedure,-7 clearly untimely. The 
Association argued to the ALT that it believed that Deutsch's 
assignment, made in May 1991, was for the 1991-92 school year 
only. Bob Rocco, the Association's president, testified that he 
was advised by Deutsch and Jano in May 1991 that the assignment 
to the new directorship was a temporary one and that he had no 
way of knowing that the District intended the assignment to be 
for a longer duration.-7 The ALJ found that the Association 
"could not be certain of the District's intentions until Jano was 
given the position of director of physical education, health and 
athletics in July of 1992." 
-'Section 2 04.1(a) of the Rules of Procedure provides that a 
charge must be filed within four months of an alleged improper 
practice. 
Z/Rocco testified that it was his understanding that the combined 
position would exist for only one school year because the filling 
of the assistant principal position at the Robert Frost School 
was a temporary assignment. He indicated that this was based on 
his conversations with Deutsch and Jano, not with the District. 
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As we recently held in Great Neck Water Pollution Control 
District,-f an employee organization's belief that a change is 
not yet effective or is temporary is not by itself sufficient to 
make a charge timely. The inquiry must also be whether that 
belief is "reasonably attributable to statements and/or actions 
by the District." Here, the District confirmed in the June 25, 
1991 memo to Jano, of which the Association was aware, that Jano 
was next in line for the position. Deutsch wrote to the District 
in April 1992 suggesting the qualifications for his replacement 
as director of physical education, health and athletics. The 
Association engaged in negotiations with the District for 
additional compensation for the position through the 1991-92 
school year and was still involved in those negotiations on 
behalf of both Deutsch and Janos at the time of the hearing in 
this matter. There is no evidence in the record that the 
District, either by statement or by action directed to the 
Association, ever indicated that the combined position would only 
exist for a year. The District had advised Jano that his 
appointment as assistant principal was for only one year, as the 
filling of that position was experimental. That Deutsch or Jano 
may have concluded that the combination of their former duties 
under the position of director of physical education, health and 
athletics was also for only one year and conveyed that belief to 
the Association cannot be attributed to the District and does not 
2/27 PERB 53057 (September 30, 1994). 
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serve to make the charge, filed more than a year after the 
combining of the titles, timely.-7 
We find that the charge is untimely and, therefore, the 
ALJ's decision must be reversed.—7 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 26, 1994 
Albany, New York 
IrfLA^ ^Lkmoil, 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
WaitedL. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
g/See Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., 25 PERB f3 051 (1992), and County 
of Onondaga. 12 PERB f3035 (1979), confid, 77 A.D.2d 783, 13 PERB 
57011 (3d Dep't 1980). 
—
7Because of our timeliness dismissal, we do not reach the 
District's other exceptions. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW ROCHELLE UNIFORMED FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 273, IAFF, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12905 
CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS F. DE SOYE, ESQ., for Charging Party 
VINCENT TOOMEY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
New Rochelle Uniformed Fire Fighters Association, Local 273, 
IAFF (Local) to a decision by the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director). 
After a hearing, the Assistant Director dismissed the Local's 
charge against the City of New Rochelle (City) which alleges, as 
amended, that the City violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it declined to promote 
fire fighter Ernest J. Horney, Jr., to the rank of fire 
lieutenant in September 1991 because of his activities as 
president of the Local. Although finding that the City knew 
Horney had engaged in several activities protected by the Act, 
the Assistant Director concluded that the Local had not proven 
that Horney would have been promoted had he not engaged in those 
Board - U-12905 -2 
statutorily protected activities. The Assistant Director 
premised his conclusion that the Local had not established the 
necessary "but for" causation on credibility resolutions, from 
which he held that the City's decision was based upon its 
determination that Horney was not qualified as of September 1991 
for a lieutenant's position. 
The Local's exceptions are based upon an argument that a 
lack of qualifications was not raised in defense by the City in 
its answer or during its opening remarks at the hearing. 
Moreover, it asserts that the City's denial in its answer that 
Fire Commissioner Raymond F. Kiernan had knowledge of Horney's 
protected activities, later established to be untrue, renders 
Kiernan's testimony regarding motive not credible. Claiming that 
the burden of proof had shifted to the City to establish a 
nondiscriminatory motive for its decision to deny Horney the 
promotion, and that the City failed to do so, the Local argues 
that the charge should be sustained in all respects. The City 
argues in response that the Assistant Director's decision should 
be affirmed because the Local did not establish improper 
motivation and, even assuming any burden of proof shifted to it, 
it showed that it was properly motivated in denying Horney the 
promotion to lieutenant. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
positions as argued in their briefs and at oral argument, we 
affirm the Assistant Director's decision. 
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The Assistant Director held that Horney was not promoted in 
September 1991 because Kiernan was persuaded by opinions 
expressed to him by Deputy Chiefs William Stone and Eamon 
McCaffrey that Horney was not then qualified to be a lieutenant. 
The Local argues, however, that this "decisive factor" was not 
raised in the City's answer or articulated by it in its opening 
statement at the hearing. From this, and alleged inconsistencies 
in Kiernan's and Stone's testimony, the Local would have us 
conclude that the business motivation ascribed to the City by the 
Assistant Director cannot be true. 
The City's answers to the charge as filed and amended 
consist of admissions and denials of each paragraph in the 
charge. The net effect of its answers in relevant respect is to 
deny the Local's allegations that it refused to promote Horney 
because of his exercise of rights protected by the Act. The City 
did not set forth the reasons why it did not promote Horney in 
September 1991, but nothing in our Rules of Procedure requires 
that type of pleading.-1 Therefore, we may not draw any adverse 
inferences or heighten our scrutiny of the record or the 
Assistant Director's credibility resolutions solely on the basis 
-
;We have had from clientele, however, proposals to amend the 
Rules to require a respondent to affirmatively plead the 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions which are the subject 
of an improper practice charge. We have not adopted this 
pleading requirement out of a concern that it might compromise 
settlement efforts and distort the respective burdens of proof. 
It is also our opinion that a charging party's opportunity to 
move for particularization of the answer affords adequate 
protection against surprise and ensures that any required hearing 
proceeds efficiently. 
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of the City's failure to plead legitimate motives for its actions 
in its answers. 
The City's opening statement at the hearing is also not 
inconsistent with the City's articulation of its motive during 
the hearing or the Assistant Director's findings in that regard. 
The City attorney's opening statement was, as is expected, a 
short, general summary of the City's position. It included, 
among other reasons for the City's declination to promote Horney, 
his failure to demonstrate leadership. That general statement is 
consistent with the subsequent proof. The City's failure or 
unwillingness to prove other of the reasons identified in its 
opening statement cannot affect the Assistant Director's 
assessment of the credibility of the individual witnesses who 
testified at the hearing. 
The City's answer is inconsistent with the subsequent proof 
in one respect. The City denied that Kiernan had notice or 
knowledge that Horney had filed any of several safety complaints 
with the State Department of Labor. The Assistant Director 
found, however, that Kiernan knew that Horney had filed one of 
the safety complaints and suspected that he had filed one or more 
of the others. Although Kiernan's established suspicions are, as 
the Assistant Director noted, not inconsistent with the City's 
answer, Kiernan's proven knowledge of the one safety complaint 
is. This inconsistency is a factor which can be considered in 
assessing credibility. As we read the Assistant Director's 
decision, he was plainly aware of the inconsistency and he 
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considered it in making his credibility resolution regarding 
Kiernan's testimony. 
In that respect, it is clear that the Assistant Director did 
not find Kiernan's testimony, or any other witnesses7 testimony 
for that matter, to be equally credible in all respects. Quite 
to the contrary, the Assistant Director noted that certain of the 
witnesses, in parts of their testimony, were confused, 
inconsistent or contradictory. A witness's lack of credibility 
in certain respects of his or her testimony, however, does not 
per se establish that the witness's testimony is incredible in 
all respects. Credibility assessments should be made, as they 
were by the Assistant Director, in a discriminating manner in 
conjunction with a particular question or a particular line of 
questioning.-7 
Having established the context in which the ALJ's 
credibility resolutions are to be reviewed, we must determine 
whether there is evidence in the record upon which those 
determinations should be reversed. Having carefully reviewed the 
record, we conclude that there is no basis upon which to reverse 
the Assistant Director's decision. 
This is a case of an employer's failure to promote allegedly 
because of an employee's exercise of statutory rights. As in 
most cases of this type, the issue in dispute is the employer's 
motive. The issue is not whether Homey was treated fairly by 
g/Social Service Employees Union, Local 371, 11 PERB f3004 
(1978). 
Board - U-12905 -6 
the City, whether the nature and extent of the City's evaluation 
of his qualifications was well reasoned or thorough, or whether 
the decision would withstand scrutiny under some different 
statutory or contractual criteria. The inquiry in this case is 
whether the Local established that Horney would have been 
promoted in September 1991 had he not engaged in the activities 
which the City knew about and concedes are protected by the Act. 
Even if Kiernan harbored some animus towards Horney because of 
his protected activities, there is no violation of the Act unless 
Kiernan acted upon that animus. That "but for" element of the 
violations alleged is the Local's burden to prove, as much as it 
was its burden to establish Horney's engagement in those 
protected activities and the City's knowledge thereof. 
In agreement with the Assistant Director, we find that the 
record establishes that Deputy Chiefs Stone and McCaffrey 
expressed an opinion to Kiernan that Horney was not qualified to 
be a lieutenant, at least as of September 1991. We further find 
no basis in the record to establish an absence of good faith in 
the Deputy Chiefs' opinions, particularly as to Stone, who was, 
at least at the relevant time, a friend of Horney. To reverse 
the Assistant Director, we would have to conclude that Kiernan 
would have disregarded the opinions and recommendations of his 
deputies and promoted Horney, had Horney not exercised his rights 
as a union officer and employee. The record affords us no basis 
upon which to make such a conclusion. 
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For the reasons set forth above, the Local's exceptions are 
dismissed and the Assistant Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 26, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Paiiline R. Kihselia/ auiine R. k Chairperson 
X. 
Wa^iter L. E i senbe rg , Member 
t ^ % ^ ^ 
E r i c J . Schmertz, Member 
2D-10/26/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROADRUNNERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1170, 
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14604 
TOWN OF HENRIETTA, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT J. FLAVIN and CHERYL L. MILLIGAN, for Charging Party 
HARRIS BEACH & WILCOX (JEFFREY D. WILLIAMS of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) filed by the Roadrunners 
Association, Local 1170, Communications Workers of America, AFL-
CIO (CWA). The ALJ dismissed CWA's charge against the Town of 
Henrietta (Town) which alleges, as amended, that the Town 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it reclassified a unit position, 
Clerk IV, to the nonunit position of Clerk to the Town Justice. 
CWA alleges that the reclassification was done without a 
substantial change in duties and to erode its unit. The ALJ 
held, however, that there was no persuasive evidence of improper 
motivation, notwithstanding a past history of strained labor 
relations between the parties. The ALJ also held that the former 
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Clerks IV assumed most, if not all, of the duties of a nonunit 
Court Administrator after that position was abolished in February 
1993, upon the resignation of the incumbent of that position. 
In its exceptions, CWA argues that the former Clerks IV did 
not assume all of the Court Administrator's duties and it 
reiterates its belief that the Town made and implemented its 
decision only to erode its unit. The Town argues in response 
that the exceptions are untimely filed and, on the merits, that 
the record clearly supports the AKT's decision. 
For the reasons set forth below, CWA's exceptions are 
dismissed and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
As to the timeliness of the exceptions, CWA received the 
ALJ's decision on May 26, 1994. Its exceptions were filed by 
mail on June 15, 1994. Its exceptions are, therefore, timely, 
having been filed within fifteen working days after its receipt 
of the ALJ's decision. 
The exceptions must be dismissed on the merits because even 
if the former Clerks IV did not assume all of the duties of the 
nonunit Court Administrator, the record shows that the duties of 
the Clerk IV position were substantially changed on 
reclassification to Clerk to the Town Justice. Therefore, there 
can be no violation of §209-a.l(a) or (d) on CWA's primary theory 
that unit positions were reclassified without a change in duties. 
For the reasons stated by the ALJ, there is no evidence of 
improper motive which would otherwise support a violation of 
§209-a.l(a) of the Act. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 26, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^uf,-^t.lLttlL 
Pauline R. i t inse l la , Chairperson 
al^er^L. Eisenberg, Membe]/ 
Eric J . /Schmertz, Member 
2E-10/26/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD , 
In the Matter of 
TRANSIT SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3994 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
PRYOR, CASHMAN, SHERMAN & FLYNN (RICHARD M. BETHEIL and 
TINA C. KREMENEZKY of counsel) for Petitioner 
ALBERT C. COSENZA, ESQ. (EVELYN JONAS Of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The New York City Transit Authority (Authority) excepts to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) issued pursuant to a representation 
petition filed by the Transit Supervisors Organization (TSO). 
The TSO by that petition seeks to represent Authority employees 
in the title of Station Supervisor Level II (SSII) . 
In its exceptions, the Authority argues that the Director 
should have dismissed the petition because the TSO had agreed 
with the Authority in a side letter to the parties' 1985-88 and 
1988-91 collective bargaining agreements that it would not seek 
to represent certain supervisory employees, including the SSIIs. 
That side agreement provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
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The [TSO] further agrees that it or any of its 
officers will not seek representation rights for 
NYCTA employees in titles above Dispatcher 
(Surface) Level I, Maintenance Supervisor Level I 
or any equivalent title . . . .-' 
According to the Director, any arguable waiver of TSO's 
statutory right to petition to represent public employees was 
limited to the terms of the 1985-88 and 1988-91 agreements. The 
latter agreement expired on June 30, 1991, allowing this 
September 1992 petition to proceed. 
The Authority argues in its exceptions that the waiver was 
not limited in its duration, was clear in its application to 
SSIIs, and was not subject to unilateral revocation by TSO's 
announcement during negotiations for the successor contract that 
it no longer intended to be bound by the side letter agreement. 
The TSO argues that the Director's decision should be 
affirmed for the reasons stated in his decision or because the 
side letter agreement is not enforceable, was waived by the 
Authority or is inapplicable to SSII employees. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Director's 
decision. 
According to the Authority, the TSO is barred from seeking 
to represent the SSIIs unless and until it is able to secure 
through negotiations an agreement altering the terms of the side 
letter. Its theory is that the terms of the side letter continue 
-''The TSO has a demand in current negotiations for a successor 
contract which would remove any restrictions on its right to seek 
to represent any Authority employees. The parties have not yet 
concluded their negotiations. 
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in effect until modified by subsequent agreement, just as 
employers are bound to continue the terms of an expired agreement 
pursuant to §209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
Even were we willing to consider a possibility of deferring 
an exercise of jurisdiction to a private agreement preventing a 
union from seeking to represent public employees, it would have 
to be manifestly clear from the terms of that agreement that it 
was the parties7 intent to prevent the filing of a representation 
petition at the time such petition was filed. In this case, the 
agreement is silent as to its duration. Without contrary 
evidence from the agreement itself, we find that the TSO was 
bound to the terms of the side letter only for the duration of 
the contracts under which the side agreement arose or was 
continued. As a matter of statutory and public policy, we could 
not allow a ban on representation petitions filed by a particular 
union on behalf of public employees to continue for an unknown 
and potentially unlimited period of time. In this case, the 
parties' last contract expired more than a year before this 
petition was filed. Therefore, the side agreement cannot serve 
to bar the petition filed in this case.-' 
-'In reaching this conclusion, we do not rely upon the TSO's 
statement during negotiations that it no longer intended to be 
bound by the side agreement. We do not, in any event, read the 
Director's decision to have held that the side agreement was 
subject to the TSO's unilateral revocation. 
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For the reasons set forth above, the Authority's exceptions 
are denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. Accordingly, 
the case is remanded to the Director for such further processing 
as may be appropriate. 
DATED: October 26, 1994 
Albany, New York 
H w \ )(-,\C-\r%jJf\_ 
PaiAine R. Ki ynsel la , Chairperson 
^^fi^^" 
Walt@r~*L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J .Z&chmertz,MemberV 
) 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DORIS SIMON, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14414 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
DORIS SIMON, Pro se 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (JULIE SANTIAGO Of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Doris Simon to 
a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). After a hearing, the Director 
dismissed Simon's amended charge that the State of New York 
(Department of Social Services) (State) had violated §209-a.l(a), 
(b), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally transferred her and Charles Semowich, 
both Public Employees Federation (PEF) shop stewards, from their 
offices at 40 North Pearl Street in Albany to a new location in 
Menands, approximately six miles away. At the close of Simon's 
case, the State moved to dismiss the charge for failure to prove 
a prima facie case. 
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Simon alleges that the State's action in transferring the 
six employees of the Bureau of Management Assistance (BMA), which 
includes both her and Semowich, from Albany to Menands, was 
motivated by anti-union animus on the part of T. Patrick 
Bartlett, Director of Administrative Support Services. In 1991, 
Semowich had filed an improper practice charge (Case No. U-12808) 
alleging that Melvin Behn, his immediate supervisor, had 
improperly rated him as "effective" rather than "highly 
effective" in a performance evaluation because he had 
successfully prosecuted an out-of-title work grievance against 
Behn.-'' We affirmed the decision of the Assistant Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant 
Director)^ finding a violation of the Act and ordering the 
State to rescind Semowich's evaluation and rate him as "highly 
effective" for the period in question.-7 It is Simon's position 
that Bartlett harbored anti-union feelings against Semowich as a 
result of the Assistant Director's decision, which was issued 
shortly before the announcement of the relocation of BMA's 
-''Bartlett, as Behn's immediate supervisor and "reviewer", had 
also signed the evaluation, but both concurred that the rating 
determination was Behn's alone. 
g/State of New York (Dep't of Social Services) . 25 PERB [^4655 
(1992). 
5/2 6 PERB [^3 02 6 (1993) 
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offices,-7 and had animus toward her for her activities as a PEF 
steward. 
Simon excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that he 
erred in denying her post-hearing request to reopen the record to 
receive evidence of her qualifications for promotion and the 
minutes of a January 1993 labor-management meeting and also that 
he made numerous errors in interpreting the facts and law. The 
State in its response argues that the Director's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are correct in all material respects and 
that his decision should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Director's dismissal of the charge. 
We note at the outset that any aspects of the charge that 
relate to Semowich must be dismissed because Simon has no 
standing to allege a violation of the Act on his behalf. An 
individual employee may only seek to vindicate his or her own 
rights. Only the recognized or certified bargaining 
representative has standing to bring charges in a representative 
capacity on behalf of other unit employees.-7 Simon's charge 
must, therefore, be viewed only in the context of her own 
statutorily protected activities and the actions taken against 
-
7The Assistant Director's decision was dated November 2, 1992, 
and the record reflects that the BMA move was the subject of 
discussion at a State-PEF labor-management meeting held on 
November 25, 1992. 
^
7A11 Public Employee Unions Benefiting Under 5208.3 of the Civil 
Service Law (Barry), 19 PERB f3031 (1986); United Univ. 
Professions, Inc., 16 PERB f3040 (1983). 
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her by the State. This is not to say, of course, that evidence 
of prior actions of an employer taken against other employees in 
retaliation for the exercise of protected rights could not be 
introduced to establish the employer's predilection toward anti-
union animus.-7 However, that does not seem to be Simon's intent 
in seeking to introduce evidence of Semowich's prior improper 
practice charge. It appears that she is alleging that the 
decision to move the entire BMA was motivated by Bartlett's 
animus toward Semowich as PEF steward and, hence, toward Simon, 
also a PEF steward. As correctly determined by the Director, 
however, the prior decision was not directed toward Bartlett, but 
was based on Behn's actions. There was no finding of any 
impropriety on Bartlett's part. Further, the record does not 
establish that Bartlett harbored any ill will toward either 
Semowich or Simon as a result of the prosecution or final outcome 
of Semowich's charge. 
To the extent that Simon's charge can be read to allege that 
the State committed a per se violation of the Act by relocating 
her, a PEF steward, to an office distant from her constituents, 
it must be dismissed. An employee is not insulated as a matter 
of statutory right from the necessary effects of an employer's 
legitimate business decision merely because the employee holds 
union office.-7 
-
7See Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of 
New York. 26 PERB f3082 (1993). 
Z7State of New York. 20 PERB ^3041 (1987) . 
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To the extent that Simon alleges that the State's decision 
to relocate her was improperly motivated because of her status or 
activities as a PEF steward, those allegations must also be 
dismissed. The record is bereft of any evidence of anti-union 
animus which could be attributed to Bartlett. Simon sought to 
establish Bartlett's animus toward her by pointing to the fact 
that she had not been promoted on two previous occasions. The 
Director rejected this argument based on Bartlett's testimony, 
which he credited, that the employees he promoted were better 
qualified than Simon. She also points to certain problems with 
computer access, office dividers and the temperature in the 
Menands location immediately following the relocation. These 
incidents or problems, however, do not establish anti-union 
animus on the part of Bartlett. Indeed, as noted by the 
Director, they represent the type of discomforts and adjustments 
one would normally expect to experience during an office 
relocation. 
Finally, the Director determined that there was a legitimate 
business reason which motivated the State's decision to transfer 
BMA's offices to Menands. He credited Bartlett's testimony, 
corroborated by John Hodgson, the supervisor for the Bureau of 
Facility Management Planning Upstate, that there was no room at 
the North Pearl Street location for three new units within the 
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Division.-/ Several units were relocated, either within the 
North Pearl Street building or to Menands, as a result of these 
additions. There was a need for space at North Pearl Street to 
accommodate the new units and it was accomplished by relocating 
BMA. 
Upon our review of the record, we find that it supports the 
Director's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
We also affirm the Director's determination not to reopen 
the record based on the request made by Simon for the first time 
in her post-hearing brief to the Director. Simon could have 
obtained the documents, perhaps not in the form offered, but in 
an acceptable form, prior to the hearing. Additionally, as found 
by the Director, there was no demonstration that the information 
contained in the documents offered might materially affect his 
final decision or warrant a contrary conclusion.^ 
-/Bartlett's Office of Administrative Services is a part of the 
Division of Management Support and Quality Improvement. Two 
units, the Bureau of Management Planning and the Office of Policy 
Program and Development, were transferred into Bartlett's 
jurisdiction from other divisions and the third, Quality Social 
Services Unit, was a new unit. 
-'Simon sought to introduce additional evidence relating to her 
claim that Bartlett had previously passed her over for promotion 
in favor of less qualified employees, in order to establish 
Bartlett's animus towards her. She also sought to introduce 
evidence of a labor-management meeting held shortly after the 
relocation to Menands. She and Semowich at that meeting had 
requested that the State reimburse PEF stewards for travel from 
the Menands location to North Pearl Street while on PEF business. 
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For the reasons set forth above, Simon's exceptions are 
denied—7 and the Director's decision is affirmed in its 
entirety. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 26, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^ JL-Kv &_ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
iXfcer L. Eisenberg, Member£ 
Eric J.yschmertz, Member 
—''The Director did, as pointed out by Simon in her exceptions, 
incorrectly characterize the meeting as being held several months 
after the relocation. It was held just a few weeks after the 
actual move, although several months after the announcement of 
the relocation. In view of the holdings of the Director, which 
we affirm, this error is not material and does not affect the 
outcome. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
- and -
NORTHPORT/EAST NORTHPORT UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, SOUTH HUNTINGTON UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, CARLE PLACE UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ROOSEVELT UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, and WYANDANCH UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employers, 
- and -
LOCAL 144, LONG ISLAND DIVISION, SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
- and -




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 




Board - Case Nos. C-4165, C-4166, C-4171, 
C-4172, C-4175 and C-4224 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C., for Petitioner United Public 
Service Employees Union/ Local 424, A Division of United 
Industry Workers District Council 424 
VLADECK, WALDMAN, ELIAS & ENGELHARD, P.C. (LARRY CARY 
of counsel), for Intervenor Local 144, Long Island 
Division, Service Employees International Union, AFL-
CIO 
GEORGE A. JACKSON, for South Huntington Union Free 
School District 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN of 
counsel), for Intervenor Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
By decision dated September 30, 1994,-' we held that United 
Public Service Employees Union, Local 424 (Local 424), A Division 
of United Industry Workers District Council 424 (District 
Council) is not an employee organization within the meaning of 
§201.5 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
Accordingly, pursuant to exceptions to a decision by the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director)-7 
filed by Local 144, Long Island Division, Service Employees 
International Union, AFL-CIO (Local 144) and the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), 
1727 PERB H3053 (1994) . 
?/27 PERB 5[4063 (1994). 
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we ordered six representation petitions filed by Local 424 
dismissed.-7 
By letter dated October 5, 1994, Local 424 filed with us a 
motion to reconsider the September 30, 1994 decision and to have 
us extend to it a period of thirty days to comply with our 
decision by "amendment to the applicable Constitutions". On 
October 7, 1994, Local 424 supplemented its motion by enclosing 
"amendments to the District Council Constitution adopted on 
October 6, 1994". No amendments to Local 424's constitution were 
submitted. Local 424 requests in its October 7, 1994 
correspondence that we "withdraw the Order issued on 
September 30, 1994 and issue a new Order consistent with what is 
[sic] the applicable standards for finding that an organization 
is a labor organization under the law". 
We afforded all parties an opportunity to respond to 
Local 424's motion. CSEA argues in its response that there is no 
basis for a motion to reconsider in these cases, that the 
amendments to the District Council's constitution are immaterial 
because they cannot be given "retroactive effect", and that we 
should, as a matter of discretion, deny the motion in the 
interest of finality and deference to Local 424's pending 
-
7The six petitions involve employees of the following public 
employers: Northport/East Northport Union Free School District, 
South Huntington Union Free School District, Carle Place Union 
Free School District, Roosevelt Union Free School District, 
Wyandanch Union Free School District, and the County of Albany 
and Albany County Sheriff. 
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judicial appeal of our September 30, 1994 decision. Local 144 
filed a late response without permission or reasonable excuse. 
We have, therefore, not considered that response in ruling on 
Local 424's motion. Except for CSEA's, no other timely response 
to Local 424's motion was filed. 
Having considered Local 424's motion and supporting papers 
and CSEA's arguments in opposition, we deny the motion. A motion 
to an administrative agency for a reconsideration of its final 
administrative action is an unusual procedure.-7 Such motions 
are properly entertained only if there is newly discovered 
evidence or the agency has overlooked or misapprehended relevant 
facts or that it has misapplied a controlling principle of 
law.-7 Local 424's evidence in support of its motion was not 
newly discovered, having been created by amendments to the 
District Council's constitution after Local 424's receipt of our 
September 30, 1994 decision. That decision neither 
misapprehended the facts on the record before us at that date nor 
misapplied the controlling law to those facts. Accordingly, 
there is no basis for a motion to reconsider. To the extent 
Local 424 moves to have us modify or reverse the September 3 0 
order dismissing the six petitions because of the subsequently 
adopted amendments to the District Council's constitution, we 
-'See, e.g., Auburn Police Local 195, Council 82, AFSCME, 10 PERB 
1[3060 (1977) ; Binghamton Fire Fighters. Local 729, IAFF. 9 PERB 
fl3078 (1976). 
-
7See, e.g., Town of Brookhaven, 19 PERB ^3010 (1986) . 
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deny that as well. That relief is the relief requested in the 
pending Article 78 proceeding appealing the September 3 0 decision 
and order. Public policy and the policies of the Act demand 
there be finality to decisions once rendered. Any questions 
concerning Local 424's status under the most recently adopted 
amendments to the District Council's constitution may be 
addressed in the context of either a petition for a declaratory 
ruling filed pursuant to Part 210 of our Rules of Procedure or 
new representation petitions filed in these or other cases. An 
extraordinary motion procedure should not be applied when 
existing procedures afford the movant an effective means of 
review. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Local 424's motion be, and it 
hereby is, denied.-7 
DATED: October 26, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
-''Member Schmertz, not having participated in the September 3 0 
decision, did not participate in the discussion or decision on 
this motion. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UTILITY WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 1-2, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4288 
NEW YORK STATE POWER AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
KEVIN G. JENKINS, ESQ., for Petitioner 
GERARD V. LOUGHRAN, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 6, 1994, Utility Workers Union of America, Local 
1-2, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed a petition seeking to represent a 
unit of employees of the New York State Power Authority. 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which 
they stipulated that the following is the appropriate negotiating 
unit: 
Included: Gas Turbine Operator, Gas Turbine Mechanic, Gas 
Turbine Technician, Purchasing Warehouse 
Assistant, General Plant Assistant. 
Excluded: All others. 
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Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held on October 3, 1994. A majority of the ballots cast by 
eligible employees were cast against representation by the 
petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED, that the petition 
should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 26, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Paulind R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4286 
TOWN OF ELBA, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
( 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 264 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time Highway Department employees. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
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shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 2 64. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 26, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Mul^tUl 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
3B-10726794 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4256 
TOWN OF CLIFTON PARK, 
Employer. 
AMENDED CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE17 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
-'The amendment modifies our Certification and Order dated 
September 30, 1994 to add the title of "Deputy Town Clerk" to the 
list of unit exclusions and inserts "Deputy Registrar" before 
"Vital Statistics" in the list of unit inclusions. These 
amendments reflect the parties' unit stipulations and issues at 
their mutual request and with their consent. 
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parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: See attached 
Excluded: See attached 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 26, 1994 
Albany, New York 
ATTACHMENT 
Included: All employees working 21 or more hours per week in the 
following job titles: 
Senior Planner 
Senior Building Inspector 
Chief Bureau of Fire Prevention 
Senior Typist/Deputy Town Clerk/Deputy Registrar Vital 
Statistics 






Parks Maintenance Supervisor 
Laborer 
Senior Typist 
Senior Van Driver 





Senior Account Clerk 
Parking Enforcement Officer 





Gate Keeper - Transfer Station 
Excluded: Town Supervisor 
Deputy Town Supervisor 
Town Councilmen 
Highway Superintendent 




Assistant Town Attorney(s) 
Secretary to Town Supervisor 
Comptroller 
Department Head of Building Department 
Department Head of Planning 
Department Head of Parks and Facilities 
Department Head of Recreation 
Chief Court Clerk 
Assistant Highway Maintenance Supervisor 
Chief Special Police 
Court Clerks 
Assessor 




Director of Community Development 
Town .Clerk 
Transfer Station Supervisor 
Animal Control Officer 
Seasonal Employees 
Deputy Town Clerk 
